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Pre f ace  
Th i s  paper  concerns  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  how p o l i c y  r e s e a r c h  
can be made more u s e f u l  i n  p r a c t i c e .  Two t y p e s  o f  p o l i c y  
r e s e a r c h  may be d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  The f i r s t  i s  r e s e a r c h  on 
i s s u e s  i n  t h e  p u b l i c  rea lm and n o t  addressed  t o  a  s p e c i f i c  
c l i e n t .  The "consumers" of  t h i s  t y p e  of  r e s e a r c h  -- t h o s e  
whom it s t i m u l a t e s  t o  thought  -- a r e  o t h e r  i n t e r e s t e d  scho- 
I a r s  and p r a c t i t i o n e r s ,  and t h e  arguments proceed from many 
d i f f e r e n t  q u a r t e r s  and p e r s p e c t i v e s .  Answers g iven  i n  t h i s  
c o n t e x t  a r e  n e i t h e r  r i g h t  nor  wrong: t h e y  merely i l l u m i n a t e  
an i s s u e  o f  p u b l i c  concern  and enhance o u r  unde r s t and ing  o f  it. 
I n  t h i s  s p e c i a l  s e n s e ,  p o l i c y  r e s e a r c h  resembles ,  i n  Cohen and 
G a r e t ' s  language,  " a  d i s c o u r s e  abou t  s o c i a l  r e a l i t y  -- a  d e b a t e  
a b o u t  s o c i a l  problems and t h e i r  s o l u t i o n s "  [ I ] .  
The second t y p e  o f  p o l i c y  r e s e a r c h  does have a  c l i e n t  and 
i s  t h e r e f o r e  p i t c h e d  t o  an e x i s t i n g  s o c i a l  problem t h a t  i s  l o -  
c a t e d  w i t h i n  a  s p e c i f i c  p o l i c y  environment.  Although w e  recog- 
n i z e  t h a t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  w e  a r e  a t t e m p t i n g  t o  draw i s  impre c i s e ,  
we propose  t o  d e a l  i n  t h i s  paper  w i t h  o n l y  t h e  second t ype  o f  
p o l i c y  r e s e a r c h  and f u r t h e r  l i m i t  o u r s e l v e s  t o  s o c i a l  p o l i c y .  
Such r e s e a r c h  i s  bought and s o l d ,  b u t  i t s  r e s u l t s  a r e  
r a r e l y  used i n  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  a  problem [ 2 1 .  Our i n t e n t i o n ,  
t h e n ,  i s  t o  f i n d  o u t  why and i n  what c i rcumstances  t h i s  outcome 
i s  h i g h l y  probable  and what ,  i f  any th ing ,  might  be done abou t  
it. 
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The Awwroach 
Our paper can be regarded as a normative/descriptive under- 
taking. It is descriptive in that several existing models of 
policy research are examined. In all of them, knowledge is 
exchanged as a commodity, but the knowledge fails to be applied 
successfully in practice. A major reason for this is shown to 
reside in the organizational and task environments of both the 
policy maker (buyer) and researcher (seller), each of whom is 
subject to a different structure of rewards. It is normative 
in that, in light of the repeated failures of traditional policy 
research, an alternative "standard" is proposed, based on the 
idea of social learning [ 3 I .  
We have not attempted a dynamic analysis that describes con- 
ditions for transition from one state (existing models of policy 
research) to another state (the social learning model), with 
explicit attention to the benefits, costs, and characteristics 
of alternative paths of transformation. Our paper is more in 
line with comparative static analysis, where a critical descrip- 
tion of several existing (if idealized) policy research models 
is presented. The social learning model is then developed as 
more appropriate to the complex dynamic and evolving context 
of contemporary policy. Many of the most important practical 
problems reside there. They include problems of institutional 
change in the face of pressures for stability, the political and 
non-rational dimensions of implementing institutional change, and 
the analysis of benefits and costs implicit in institutional 
transformation, as well as problems of measurement. Clearly, 
intensification is needed of both conceptuaL and operational 
research on the general problems of knowledge transfer, on the 
relationship between institutional change and maintenance, and 
on problems of implementation. Nevertheless, .we are persuaded 
that better rationalizations concerning the relation of policy 
making to research have to be developed first. 
The Setting 
The general class of problems with which we are concerned can 
be characterized as "strategic planninq problemsn. They include 
those current decisions that will significantly affect future 
policy alternatives and/or the environment within which policy 
will be formulated and implemented. They tend to be unstructured 
problems [4] : 
There is no cut-and-dry method for handling the 
problem because it hasn't arisen before, or because 
its precise nature and structure are elusive and 
complex, or because it is so important that it 
deserves a custom-tailored treatment [5]. 
By unstructured policy problems we mean those for which 
... the system has no specific procedures ... but 
must fall back on whatever general capacity it has 
for intelligent, adaptive, problem-oriented action [6]. 
A given issue may be recognized as an unstructured strategic 
planning problem at the outset of the policy process. Alter- 
natively, what was initially considered a relatively well- 
defined, operational problem may emerge as ill-structured and 
strategic in nature. This class of problems is both significant 
and pervasive in public decision-making. It is precisely in this 
context that policy research becomes mostimportant as a form of 
"learning". 
We can clarify these distinctions with the help of the 
following matrix [7][8]. On the vertical axis we can identify 
two polar cases. In cells I and 111, goals are explicitly known 
and can be formulated as "standards" against which alternative 
courses of action are evaluated. In cells I1 and IV, goals are 
ambiguous, multiple, and conflicting. It is difficult to evaluate 
the contributions and impacts of activities on a scale which is 
either not defined ox is developing. 
Means-ends relationships 
are known at least 
probabilistically 
Means-ends relationships 
are highly uncertain 
Goals are 
known 
I 
I11 
Goals are ambiguous 
or in conflict 
I1 
IV 
On the horizontal axis, in cells I and 11, means-ends 
relationships can be known, and critical variables can be iden- 
tified. By contrast, in cells 111 and IV, means-ends relation- 
ships are ambiguous even when, as in cell 111, goals are clearly 
defined. The specification of critical variables is elusive and 
the contribution of activities to performance is uncertain. 
Our focus is primarily on policy problems that emerge in cell 
IV. There is no explicit agreement on goals, nor is there a 
clear understanding of means-ends relationships. These are the 
problems that typically require policy research, since their 
resolution is a complex, evolving process. It is from this per- 
spective that we examine the question of how policy research can 
be made more useful in practice. 
Summary of Social Learning Model 
Social learning occurs in a setting of social practice. The 
latter may be conceptualized as composed of four dynamically 
interrelated processes: the formulation of a theory of reality, 
the articulation of relevant social values, the selection of an 
appropriate political strategy, and the implementation of prac- 
tical measures or social action. Traditional policy research has 
focussed primarily on the first of these--the theory of reality-- 
which may be broadly defined as the actor's image of the situation 
that confronts him. 
This image can be shown to have both a relatively stable core 
and a variable periphery of related meanings. Effective action on 
a major social problem may require a change in this image. And 
this, in turn, may require a restructuring of core meanings as well 
as modification in the actor's other processes of social practice-- 
his social values, political strategy, and implementation practice. 
These dimensions, however, are not easily touched by traditional 
research. 
Research may assist in the restructuring of the policy maker's 
image of reality by designing and becoming part of one or more 
experimental settings for social practice. Contrary to recent 
thinking about social experimentation, these settings are not 
regarded as controlled experiments that critically assess the 
efficacy of a specific innovation in policy but as an open-ended 
exploration of a total environment that promises to lead to the 
discovery of ways that will recast a given problem situation into 
a more desirable form. 
The major elements of this new model, which is ultimately 
based on the idea of social learning, are described, and criteria 
for devising experimental settings are suggested. The paper con- 
cludes with speculative comments on how the learning acquired in 
experimental settings may be rendered more generally useful in 
the solution of a social problem. 
Assumptions of Traditional Policy Research 
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that the potential 
user of policy research--the client--is identical with the contrac- 
ting party for research; we shall call him the policy maker. In 
practice, the two may be quite different entities, as when the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare finances research 
involving a university-based research team and a local school 
board to test a system of educational vouchers. By our simplifying 
assumption, both the immediate client and the more distant finan- 
cing agency will be treated as one and the same. This will facili- 
tate the exposition of what we have to say; it will not signifi- 
cantly distort our conclusions. 
In the typical case, then, the policy maker becomes aware of 
and confronts an issue which resists his attempt to resolve it. 
Suspecting that the fault may lie with his incomplete understanding 
of the causes of the problem, he turns to a policy research unit 
for an independent, scientific assessment of the problem. There 
may be a number of other reasons why the policy maker may wish to 
buy new knowledge, but these do not concern us here. Instead, we 
shall deal with a case of presumed ignorance on his part. The 
research unit, then, agrees to sell its services in the expectation 
(or hope) that the knowledge gained from its research will be used 
in the attempted solution of the problem. This situation, which we 
regard as typical, rests on four major premises: 
1. that the problem is likely to yield to scientific analysis; 
2. that the problem is well bounded and technical; 
3. that no serious conflict exists between the value 
premises of policy maker and researcher so that the 
problem can be studied objectively by removing social 
valuations as an independent variable from the 
analysis; and 
4. that the policy maker will rationally respond to and 
act upon new information by taking the actions that 
are necessary to implement a "scientific" solution. 
Models of policy Research 
Current policy analysis conforms to a Market Model of 
research in which knowledge is bought and sold as a packaged 
commodity, usually in the form of a written report. Figure 1 
shows the basic model, of which 311 other models to be discussed 
in this section are simple variants. In this model, both policy 
maker (PM) and policy researcher (PR) occupy the same organiza- 
tional environment or transaction space, W-i. This is a world 
of common understandings concerning the major features of the 
problem, the basic social valuations that pertain to it, and 
the rules that govern the exchange of information. It is a 
demand-activated mode& in which the policy maker (consumer) 
signals his "needs for information" (demand) to the researcher 
(producer) who, based on his subsequent studies, supplies hand- 
crafted conclusions and recommendations for action to his client. 
* 
kl -  i 
PRODUCER CONSUMER 
PR Policy Researcher 
PM Policy Maker 
Fig. 1: The Market Model of Policy Research 
In its basic form, the Market Yodel is grossly unrealistic. 
Policy maker and researcher do not inhabit the same environment. 
As portrayed in Figure 2, their worlds are altogether different. 
While the policy researcher is at home in the world of academia 
(W-I), the policy maker inhabits the world of politics (W-11). 
The latter is characterized by tight decision deadlines, short 
time horizons, complex political pressures, critical pay-offs, 
and the hierarchical constraints of bureaucratic management. The 
policy maker's criterion for accepting or rejecting new informa- 
tion is an essentially pragmatic one: will it lead to a workable 
solution? 
Fig. 2: The Modified Market Model of Policy Research 
The world of academia, on the other hand, is the world of 
disciplinary studies, peer review, and research monographs. 
Denizen of this world, the research scientist is prepared to 
incorporate the relevant findings that result from colleagues' 
work into his own, and whether he chooses to do so depends es- 
sentially on such objective criteria as statistical adequacy, 
logical consistency, propriety of method, and empirical evidence 
[9]. He has learned to be open to new facts, insights, and ideas, 
to nurture a critical spirit, and to use knowledge obtained 
through the methods of science in the construction, elaboration, 
and testing of theories that are meant to account for and explain 
selected aspects of the observed world. He will be especially 
alert to any knowledge that appears to contradict his own 
theories which, in this way, are put to the critical test of 
falsification. In due course, following these procedures, 
a powerful and scientifically based picture of the world results 
from this collective effort. According to Schroedinger, this 
"pictureN or "image" is the ultimate reason why we engage in 
scientific work [lo] . Although the image may evolve over time, 
the major traditions of scientific inquiry remain essentially 
unchanged [ll] . 
These two worlds, then, are far apart in most of their 
significant dimensions, and they tend to draw even further apart 
by the vast differences that exist in the structure of their 
reward systems. In Figure 2, this is symbolized by the heavy 
arrows that point outwards from the diagram in opposite direc- 
tions. It is, therefore, scarcely surprising that substantial 
barriers to effective communication exist between the worlds of 
academia and of politics (shown by vertical double lines in 
Figure 2). The actors in each world are likely to respond to 
different cues, and neither is likely to hold the other in very 
high esteem. In their study of the dismal failures of research 
relevant to planning, Dubbink and Reiff quote an anonymous uni- 
versity man as saying: "If they (i.e., planning practitioners) 
had anything going for them they wouldn't be where they are." 
And the government official returns the compliment: "They (i.e., 
academics) come in here and start pontificating, and we know in 
a minute that we're not going to get anything out of them." [12]. 
To meet this problem, the policy maker may be inclined to 
create his own Internal Research Unit (IRU) within World-11. 
We have labelled this the Bureaucratic Model of policy research 
(Figure 3 ) .  The Internal Research Unit has a double purpose 
here: to give continuing policy advice to the decision makers 
in World-I1 and to act in a liaison function with the university- 
based research units in World-I, interpreting the needs of 
policy to science and the practical meanings and implications of 
scientific study for use in policy and social practice. 
Fig. 3: The Bureaucratic Model of Policy Research 
This, at least, is the design; the practice may be very 
different. In order to survive in World-11, the Internal 
Research Unit will have to adopt the behavior normally expected 
of senior government offic,ials and stay closely attuned to the 
shifting requirements of public policy. Academicians may there- 
fore perceive the internal research staff of World-I1 as a group 
of "former" scientists who have "sold out" to the short-range 
pragmatism that pervades the world of politics. And, indeed, 
its liaison work may bumble along quite ineffectively. To the 
extent that it serves its master well, it sacrifices science to 
the needs of organization, losing touch with the currents and 
counter-currents of scientific thinking. Thus, the Bureaucratic 
Model is only a small improvement over the Modified Market Model 
shown in Figure 2. 
Finally, certain avant-garde agencies, aware of the pitfalls 
of the Bureaucratic Model, may opt for an Academic Model of Policy 
Research (Figure 4). Here, the Internal Research Unit has been 
weaned from daily contact with policy making and has come to share 
many of the preoccupations of the academic world. It will tend 
to be staffed with bright Ph.D.'s fresh out of graduate school 
who are looking for some practical experience with government 
before settling down into an academic career. The Academic Model 
therefore shifts both our "worldsw towards the basic research pole 
of scientific work (BR), and away from the more mundane tasks of 
social policy making (PM). For the status of "pure", disinterested 
research is still very high in academic circles, and the neat 
demonstration of a theorem is likely to get one more quickly 
promoted t o  t e n u r e  t h a n  a  c o n s u l t a n t  r e p o r t  on s o l i d  was te  
d i s p o s a l  t o  t h e  Municipal  S a n i t a t i o n  Department of  Roches te r ,  
New York. 
PM P o l i c y  Maker 
I R U  I n t e r n a l  Research Un i t  
P R  P o l i c y  Research Un i t  
BR B as i c  Research 
F i g .  4 :  The Academic Model of  P o l i c y  Research 
I n  sum, it i s  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  Market Model of  P o l i c y  
Research and i t s  major var iants- -Modif ied ,  B u r e a u c r a t i c ,  and 
Academic--will y i e l d  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s  i n  p r a c t i c e .  Knowledge 
t r e a t e d  a s  though it w e r e  a  commodity canno t  be r e a d i l y  under- 
s t o o d ,  t r a n s l a t e d ,  and f i t t e d  i n t o  t h e  ongoing s t r e a m  of d e c i s i o n s  
and a c t i o n s  t h a t - p e r m e a t e s  t h e  l i f e  of  p u b l i c  agenc i e s .  The 
f a m i l i a r  mechanics of g e n e r a t i n g  and t r a n s m i t t i n g  w r i t t e n  r e p o r t s  
on p o l i c y  q u e s t i o n s  t h u s  appear  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  
purposes  o f  " s o l v i n g "  s o c i a l  problems.  A s  Cohen and Ga re t  con- 
c l u d e ,  " t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  ev idence  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  government 
p lann ing  o f f i c e s  have succeeded i n  l i n k i n g  s o c i a l  r e s e a r c h  and 
decision-making" [ 1 3 ] .  Corrobora ted  many t i m e s  o v e r ,  t h i s  con- 
c l u s i o n  e i t h e r  l e a v e s  u s  t o  i ndu lge  a  f a t a l i s t i c  d e s p a i r  o r  
encourages  u s  t o  s e a r c h  f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  models. The l a t t e r  i s  
t h e  c o u r s e  w e  now i n t e n d  t o  t a k e .  
S o c i a l  P r a c t i c e  a s  a  Learning Paradigm 
Suppose, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  a  p o l i c y  r e s e a r c h  u n i t  h a s  been 
asked t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  problem of  sub-normal 'performance on 
s c h o l a s t i c  achievement tests  i n  secondary  s choo l s  where a  m a j o r i t y  
o f  t h e  s t u d e n t s  a r e  members of  e t h n i c  m i n o r i t y  groups .  The 
r e s e a r c h  s u g g e s t s  a  f u n c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c l a s s  s i z e  
and test performance and, based on this relationship, recommends 
a reduction in average class size as the solution to the problem. 
But this "knowledge" and the recommendation flowing from it are, 
at this point, nothing more than a theory of the problem that 
will require verification in practice before it can be accepted 
as a guide to policy. Until such verification takes place, th6 
theory may appear more or less plausible, but it is not neces- 
sarily "correct". 
From the policy maker's standpoint, acceptance of a recom- 
mendation to reduce the average number of students per class would 
imply a major change in the organization of secondary education. 
This can be readily understood by looking at Figure 5 which shows 
the four major subprocesses that together compose the paradigm of 
social practice. 
The key terms of this paradigm are defined below. 
THEORY OF REALITY: a symbolic -representation and expla- 
nation of the environment confronting an actor. It defines 
the actor's situation and his role in it. 
SOCIAL VALUES: a set of values that provides normative 
guidance in selecting the actor's strategy. Social values 
may be expressed holistically as a desirable image of 
future reality or as a set of discrete decision criteria. 
In the first, more comprehensive sense, the actor will seek 
to actualize his values and so transform present reality in 
accord with his image of what the world should be. In the 
second, narrower meaning, norms are used to make valuations 
that lead to the selection of appropriate strategies for 
action. 
POLITICAL STRATEGY: a course of action chosen as the one 
most likely to produce the desired outcome. 
SOCIAL ACTION: practical measures taken to implement the 
preferred strategy. 
THEORY OF P O L I T I C A L  
R E A L I T Y  STRATEGY 
S O C I A L  S O C I A L  
V A L l l E S  A C T  I ON 
Fig. 5: The Paradigm of Social Practice 
These processes come to life only in the context of a con- 
crete action-setting, and they are so connected that a change 
in any one of them will necessarily affect all others, either 
producing a substantive change or confirming the existing practice. 
Let us now return to our example. The research on scholastic 
achievement dealt with only one of the subprocesses of our paradigm, 
the "theory of reality",insofar as it concerned academic perfor- 
mance. The problem was not, however, studied in the four-fold 
context of social practice, but abstracted from this context 
through an operation which allowed the remaining subprocesses to 
be held constant (Figure 6). 
In the language of the Market Model and its variants, the 
problem was conceived as the transfer (or sale) of knowledge 
from producer to potential consumer either to replace TR, with TR2 
in Figure 6 or, more modestly, to modify the policy maker's present 
"theory" in light of a scientifically "improved" version of TR2. 
But a change in the policy maker's "theory" necessarily implies 
a change in the other subprocesses of his paradigm. Whether or 
not he will accept the new theory as a basis for his subsequent 
social practice will, therefore, depend on his ability and his 
willingness to increase the size of his investment and operating 
budget or to divert funds from existing commitments to the 
proposed program requiring construction of additional class 
rooms and lower student/teacher ratios. And this involves a 
question of political strategy. It will depend as well on the 
relative strength of his commitment to improving the scholastic 
performance of minority students (i.e., his social values). In 
sum, the policy maker's willingness to "insert" a new theory of 
reality into his going paradigm requires filling all the boxes 
on the right-hand side of Figure 6 with new meaning. And this 
he may not be prepared to do. 
BUYS 
\ 
P O L I C Y  TR Theory of Reality 
MAKER SV Social Values 
POLICY PS Political Strategy 
UNIT SA Social Action 
SV S A 
Fig. 6: Policy Research and Social Practice in the 
Market Model of policy Research 
The paradigm of social practice helps us to understand in 
what specific sense we must perceive policy research as a pro- 
cess of social learning. Social action produces consequences 
that, in turn, call forth responses in the actor's theory of 
reality, his values, and his strategy, either confirming what 
he already knows or creating incongruities that clamor for reso- 
lution. Thus, to test the "correctness" of a new theory of 
reality (TR*), new action must be undertaken, and this requires 
activating a whole new paradigm of social practice. 
The Role of Images 
The problem we posed at the beginning of this paper may now 
be restated: how should policy research be organized and carried 
out in order to transform the policy maker's social practice as 
a whole--reformulate his theory of reality, articulate anew his 
social purposes, reconsider the question of strategy, and implement 
new measures. 
Market models of policy research focus exclusively on the 
cognitive component in social practice; they operate on the theory 
of reality in isolation of the remaining components. A policy 
maker is, therefore, likely to contract for applied research only 
when his experience with the results of past actions fails to 
confirm the paradigm governing these actions and, more specifical- 
ly, the theory of reality which constitutes an integral part of 
his paradigm. Where it is positively reinforced, a theory of 
how the actor's world is made will simply be maintained as a 
basis for further action? 
Following Boulding's terminology, a given theory of reality 
may also be called the actor' s image of his situation [14] . The 
image is a composite structure of cognitive elements that may be 
divided into those which constitute a core and a periphery. 
Whereas peripheral elements may be changed independently of the 
core, the latter cannot be changed without transforming the 
periphery as well. 
An example may help to clarify this distinction. Returning! 
to our policy maker who is concerned with low scholastic perfor- 
mance of ethnic minority students, we may describe his theory of 
reality (his image) as follows: 
1. Core: Voter resistance to increased taxation is strong; 
voters prefer ethnically separate school facilities; 
poor scholastic performance is a significant issue agi- 
tating public opinion. 
2. Periphery: Scholastic achievement can be objectively 
measured by means of appropriate testing instruments 
and varies with biological and cultural factors. 
The policy researcher's relevant image, on the other hand, 
might have this structure: 
1. Core: Scholastic achievement can be objectively measured 
by means of appropriate testing instruments and varies 
with conditions in the immediate school environment. 
Improving environmental conditions can therefore lead to 
improved performance on achievement tests. 
2. Periphery: Methods for measuring scholastic achievement 
may vary and, for certain purposes, some may be preferable 
to others. None is a perfect measure. Specific factors 
in school environments may have differential effects on 
measured scholastic achievement. 
In this example, the policy maker's core image is expressed in 
political terms, while the core of the researcher's image (influen- 
ced by his academic setting) seizes upon a "thematic" explanation 
of the problem in terms of environmental factors [15]. We also 
observe that the political questions which constitute the core of 
the policy maker's image are completely absent from the researcher's 
cognitive horizon. 
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the policy maker 
will define the problem in terms of a perceived political issue 
(low scholastic achievement). But while lying at the core of his 
image, "low scholastic achievement" is explained by a theory of 
biological and cultural determinism that is located in the peri- 
phery of his image. In contracting for research, however, the 
problem is posed, not in terms of this core image and so as one of 
political strategy, but in terms of the variables that supposedly 
"determine" scholastic achievement and for which, it is presumed, 
a scientific answer can be found. As a result, the researcher 
focusses on a theory of scholastic achievement (the policy 
researcher's core image attributes variations in scholastic 
achievement to environmental conditions), while the researcher's 
peripheral image concerns more technical matters, such as testing 
procedures and salient environmental conditions. 
When research "solves" the policy maker's problem as origi- 
nally posed by him, it will, therefore, fail to address the 
political core of the policy maker's image. To confound matters 
still further, the researcher's core image will clash with the 
theory of scholastic achievement that is lodged in the periphery 
of the policy maker's image. Thus, even if the policy researcher 
should succeed in persuading his client of the plausibility of his 
practical "solution" (i.e., smaller class sizes as a salient 
environmental condition), the client's core image will remain 
unaffected. In addition, the policy maker will view the recom- 
mendation for smaller classes as having a potentially adverse 
impact. Its implementation would require larger public expendi- 
tures, and this is counter-indicated by his understanding of the 
situation (i.e., voter resistance to increased taxation). As a 
result, recommendations for action are likely to be ignored. 
The question may now be raised: given that the research 
findings are only working hypotheses derived from statistical 
analysis of selected information, can these findings be tested 
in practice and so, perhaps, become sufficiently persuasive to 
lead to a revision of the policy maker's core image as well? 
In other words, can an "experimental setting" for social practice 
be designed that will, at least within a single school, involve 
the breakdown of large class sizes into smaller instructional 
units? According to the initial hypothesis, such an action should 
lead to a measurable improvement in scholastic performance. 
The Social Learning Model of Policy Research 
We shall assume that the policy maker agrees to an experiment 
in social practice. Such an experiment, however, differs radically 
from the received model of scientific inquiry. For in social 
practice, the point is not to falsify the hypothesis--a step that 
would be consistent with the canons of scientific experimentation-- 
but to create a wholly new, unprecedented situation that, in its 
possiblility for qenerating new knowledge, goes substantially 
beyond the initial hypothesis [161. An experiment in social prac- 
tice would thus be judged successful if it raised scholastic per- 
formance, even where the reasons could not be ascribed to a reduction 
in class size. What the literature affectionately knows as the 
Hawthorne Effect would thus be treated not as a pathology but as 
an integral part of the experiment [17]. 
This point is sufficiently important to deserve additional 
explanation. In contrast to controlled experiments, experimental 
settings for social practice imply that the motivations introduced 
will go beyond changing merely one element (average size of class) 
in order to remain open for experimental variation in all of the 
component parts of social practice and so create the possibility 
for a substantial transformation of reality. 
Experimental settings for social practice clash with views 
expressed in Riecken and Boruch's recent book on social experi- 
mentation [la]. The authors there propose what might be called 
a medical model of social experimentation in which the patient 
is society and the doctors are research scientists. The problem, 
as they see it, is to find which medication is likely to restore 
the patient to good health. Riecken and Boruch advocate a method 
of controlled experimentation which operates, one variable at a 
time, upon a randomized target population. The proposed proceclures 
are extremely demanding and do not allow for significant partici- 
pation by the target group in the design of the experiment itself. 
The hypothesis is then accepted or rejected on the basis of 
various statistical tests. 
Social practice, on the other hand, constitutes a holistic 
and open experiment in time. Focussed on a non-randomly selected 
"setting", the experiment is designed as a learning excercise 
with full participation of the affected population. Each setting 
would have at least the following characteristics. It would be: 
- small enough to facilitate face-to-face encounters of 
researchers, innovators, and affected population; 
- inclusive enough to make the affected population actively 
participate in the experiment; 
- simple enough to permit each participant to acquire a sense 
of personal efficacy; 
- autonomous enough to carry out appropriate actions; and 
- bounded enough to bring these actions into focus and to 
permit a clear evaluation of results. 
In the context of our continuing example, such a setting 
would be a specific locality, a school. It may be helpful to 
show how such an experiment in social practice might be used 
to generate significant new knowledge. 
STEP I: A policy research group is retained to undertake 
'studies into the question of scholastic under- 
achievement. In due course, research findings 
are reported and the creation of an experimental 
setting for social practice is proposed. 
STEP 11: The proposal is evaluated by the policy maker and 
agreement is reached on conducting the experiment. 
A location is tentatively selected and, in the course 
of several lengthy discussions, the willingness 
of local school authorities to participate in the 
experiment is obtained. 
STEP 111: A small Experiment and Innovation Group (EEI) is 
set up consisting of members drawn from the policy 
research team, the policy-making staff, local 
school officials, teachers, students, and parents. 
Discussions proceed on the redesign of the school 
in accord with the original hypothesis (smaller 
classes) but, in the course of these discussions, 
new problems will have to be dealt with, calling 
forth additional hypotheses for action. A new 
social practice model is therefore being activated: 
images of reality, social values, political stra- 
tegies, and actions are all changing. 
STEP IV: Innovations are beginning to be introduced. Regular 
school activities continue and scholastic achievement 
is tested at regular intervals. Test results are 
compared with earlier records. The EEI Group con- 
ducts further evaluation studies. 
STEP V: Based on the complete records of the experiment, 
a preliminary report of findings is made by the 
EEI Group to the policy maker, together with 
recommendations for further actions. 
STEP VI: This report becomes the basis for considering, at 
the policy-making level, what the experiment has 
taught regarding'the continued usefulness of the 
ruling paradigm of social practice. Individual 
consultations, drawing on the embodied knowledge 
of the participants, continue. Steps are initiated 
to generalize from the experimental setting to the 
larger system of which it forms a part. 
Experimental Settings and Transactive Planning 
Up to now, we have concentrated on how the policy researcher's 
core image might affect the policy maker's peripheral image. 
But from our e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n ,  we a l s o  know t h a t  t h e  co re  
images of t h e  two d ive rge ,  and t h a t  no change i n  p o l i c y  i s  pos- 
s i b l e  wi thout  a  p r i o r  change i n  t h e  p o l i c y  maker ' s  co re  image. I f  
p o l i c y  r e sea rch  should ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  wish t o  i n f l u e n c e  s o c i a l  
p r a c t i c e ,  t h e  t a s k  i s  t o  fo rge  a  new theo ry  of  r e a l i t y  t h a t ,  
whi le  combining t h e  d ive rg ing  co re  images of r e s e a r c h e r  and 
po l i cy  maker, t ranscends  them both i n  a  new s y n t h e s i s .  This  
process  occurs  on ly  i n  t h e  course  of s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  i t s e l f .  
For co re  images of r e a l i t y  a r e  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  reorganized  on ly  
through exper imental  l e a r n i n g  [19] .  
The exper imental  s e t t i n g  c o n s t i t u t e s  an environment i n  
which converge t h e  s e p a r a t e  images n o t  on ly  of  r e sea rche r  and 
p o l i c y  maker bu t  a l s o  of t h e  l o c a l  school  o f f i c i a l s ,  t e a c h e r s ,  
s t u d e n t s ,  and paren ts  who, t o g e t h e r ,  c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  Experiment 
and Innovat ion Group ( E & I )  t h a t  i s  r e spons ib l e  f o r  t h e  conduct 
of t h e  experiment.  This  r eo rgan iza t ion  and s y n t h e s i s  of  images 
occurs  i n  t h e  course  of  t h e  a c t i o n  i t s e l f  through t h e  p a t i e n t  
n u r t u r i n g  of person-centered d ia logue  and mutual l ea rn ing .  
This s t y l e  of s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  has  been c a l l e d  t r a n s a c t i v e  
planning,  des igna t ing  a  process  by which a  s c i e n t i f i c a l l y  
schooled i n t e l l i g e n c e  j o i n s  w i th  t h e  persona l  knowledge of  t h e  
a f f e c t e d  popula t ion  i n  t h e  process  of s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  [20]. 
I t  i s  through t r a n s a c t i v e  planning t h a t  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  d i s c o v e r s  
how t o  d e a l  wi th  a  s p e c i f i c  problem. S o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  may t h u s  
be understood a s  a  p rocess  t h a t  gene ra t e s  n o t  on ly  a  new and 
t a n g i b l e  r e a l i t y  b u t  a l s o  t h e  means of acqu i r ing  new knowledge 
about it. S o c i a l  p r a c t i c e  i s  a  process  of  gene ra t ing  s o c i a l  
l e a rn ing .  
Genera l iz ina  t h e  Model: 
Towards a   earning Soc ie ty  
The ques t ion  of p o l i c y  r e sea rch  has  l e d  us  from a  review of  
a  s e t  of market models t o  a  f i r s t  exp lo ra t ion  of t h e  s t r u c t u r e  
and l o g i c  of exper imental  s e t t i n g s  f o r  s o c i a l  p r a c t i c e .  S o c i a l  
p r a c t i c e ,  we sugges ted ,  may b e s t  be viewed i n  terms of  a  para-  
digm t h a t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h e  i d e a  of a  t r a n s a c t i v e  s t y l e  of plan- 
ning.  The paradigm makes t h e  important  ep i s temologica l  assumption 
that action-hypotheses are verified as "correct" knowledge only 
in the course of a social practice that includes the four com- 
ponents of theory, values, strategy, and action. A further 
epistemological commitment is to the creation of a new reality 
and so new knowledge rather than establishing the truth-value 
of propositions in abstraction from the social context to which 
they are applied. To this extent, experiments in social practice 
differ from the traditional procedures of experimental science. 
The question must now be faced of how the conclusions drawn 
from a given experimental setting may be reinserted into the 
ruling social paradigm that governs structures, programs, and 
behavior in the policy maker's world of politics (W-I1 in Figures 
2-4). This question turns out to be the critical issue in policy 
research. Unless a satisfactory answer is forthcoming, social 
experiments "in the small" will forever remain isolated instances 
from which little of any consequence can be learned for the larger 
social practice to which they are related. 
A possible solution can be approached only in stages. If we 
assume, as we must, that every experimental setting creates its 
own "world" (W-111, IV, ..., n), then, perhaps, we should follow 
Ashby's law of "requisite variety" which states that "R's capacity 
as a regulator cannot exceed R's capacity as a channel of communi- 
cation" [21]. Accordingly, we ought to do away with World-I1 
altogether and shift to a model of radical decentralization in 
which World-I1 is simply "dissolved" into a very large number 
of separate and varied "worlds", each of which would represent 
a single experiment in social practice and learning. 
In this formulation, each experimental setting adjusts inde- 
pendently to the relevant environmental disturbance. No inter- 
action among settings is assumed to exist, nor are significant 
externalities generated by the individual experiment. Therefore, 
given a number of isolated settings, a systemic adaptation to 
the environment occurs simply as the sum of individual successful 
adjustments. Let us call this the "anarchic" solution in which 
policy research becomes unnecessary because World-I1 no longer 
exists. 
Although the anarchic solution would allow for an enormous 
variety of experimental settings that may exist but not exceed 
the regulator's capacity for communication, it would fail to 
respond to the fact that experimental settings do not, in fact, 
exist in isolation from each other but are joined into more en- 
compassing networks of social practice. That which joins them is, 
by definition, common to all "worlds" and so constitutes a world 
of shared relations that must be managed in the interest of all. 
To put the matter differently, the process of adjustment and 
experimentation in any part of the system generates certain 
externalities and consequences, both direct and indirect. The 
process of overall adaptation can then no longer be assumed to 
be simply the summation of individual adjustments. Research must 
focus on the dynamic structure of the system as a whole. Syste- 
matic relations may be strong or weak but, where they exist, the 
anarchic solution must be reject.ed as inappropriate, and we must 
ask: what changes are required in World-I1 to make this world 
conform more closely to the law of requisite variety in social 
practice? 
To put the matter thus is to pass judgment on methods of 
present system management. It would appear that organizational 
environments in the United States have become too richly joined, 
in Ashby's phrase, so that when adaptations do occur, they 
general.1~ occur too late [ 2 2 ]  . Such an environment with its 
multiplicity of feedback loops, tends to be over-managed and 
under-controlled, and as a consequence becomes both "turbulent" 
and tyrannical [ 2 3 ]  . 
In the United States, it is clear that World-I1 is not now 
an arrangement that effectively supports decentralized social 
practice except on a self-contained, self-terminating basis. 
Although many experiments are being conducted, present conditions 
are inappropriate for translating what is being learned into 
the larger social practice of World-11. As a result, public 
policies flounder, and the results they bring forth are only 
fortuitously in accord with expectations. Most of the time, 
central policies are confounded by the immense variety of local 
conditions. And, excessively concerned with local impacts, 
they frequently fail to address the questions arising from the 
structural relations that bind experimental settings into a larger 
structured whole [ 2 4 ] .  We do not propose, because we are unable 
to do so at this time, to "solve" the riddle of system-wide 
learning. What we can do is to suggest some conditions for 
policy research and social practice that we believe to be es- 
sential for a definitive solution of the problem. 
First among these is a forthright commitment to the idea 
of social experimentation, practice, and learning as the principal 
method for public intervention. This means a commitment not only 
to decentralization in the management of change, but also to the 
regular and systematic use of Experiment and Innovation Groups 
(EEG) to carry out and assess the cost-effectiveness of social 
practice in experimental settings. Second is the formation of 
central organizations to support local experiments. This would 
obviate the need for the internalization of functional supports 
by each setting and help in achieving economies of scale that 
would enhance the cost-effectiveness of each experiment. And 
the third condition is the establishment of expanded channels 
of communication for the lateral diffusion of new experiences 
and learning among the multiple experiments themselves, letting 
information about them filter horizontally among them no less 
than vertically to central levels, thereby enriching the context 
of information for the realization of each experiment. 
If we remain true to our model, we are forced to say that 
the establishment of these conditions must itself be subject 
to social experimentation, practice, and learning. Little 
would be accomplished by prolonged theoretical study in isola- 
tion from practice itself. The first step in a regeneration 
of World-I1 is, therefore, the creation of EEI units at the 
appropriate central levels for the purpose of creating conditions 
suitable for a social practice model of policy research [ 2 5 1 .  
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